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Abstract 
A seemingly insular Armenian Church election that took place in Lebanon in 
February 1956 was simultaneously a site of contestation by Cold War powers and 
their proxies. Its disproportionately high coverage in the Lebanese press--and 
ensuing political intervention--provides an alternative view of the struggles for power 
between the United States and the USSR in Lebanon during the Cold War period. 
This election could have been understood as exclusively affecting Armenians in 
Lebanon and/or merely an entertaining anecdote of competition between Armenian 
religious figures. Instead, I argue that it is an opening to observe American-Soviet 
state competition for political influence in the region outside of the conventional case 
studies of the 1958 US marine intervention in Lebanon and the American 
government’s inability to prevent the Soviet suppression in Hungary in the aftermath 
of the Tripartite Aggression in Egypt in October 1956. And yet, this election must 
also concurrently be seen as a moment where the Armenian population of Lebanon 
made use of Cold War suspicions to designate a leader of the Armenian Church seen 
to suit their community’s interests. This article throws into relief the customary 
depiction and understanding of the Armenian population in Lebanon as temporary 
refugees and therefore not an integral part of the Lebanese nation-state by drawing 
out the use of Cold War rivalries.   
 
 
 
THE LONG DELAYED ELECTION 
The death of Karekin I in 1952 left vacant the seat of the Catholicos, the 
highest figure in the Armenian Apostolic Church of the Cilician See. Multiple 
postponements plagued the electoral process. Unable to elect a successor due 
to internal disagreements, the electoral committee appointed Archbishop 
Khoren Paroyan, Prelate of Lebanon, the See’s caretaker until a time when a 
successful election could take place. 2  On February 20, 1956, Zareh, an 
outspoken critic of communism and the USSR was finally elected.3 Speaking 
against what he considered to be “organized attempts by Soviet authorities to 
use the Echmiadzin See as an instrument to control the Armenian 
communities of the Diaspora,” his selection officially positioned the Cilician 
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See against the Echmiadzin See, the Soviet Republic of Armenia, and the 
USSR. 4  Chaos ensued. Violent clashes erupted between supporters and 
opponents of Zareh. The President of Lebanon, Camille Chamoun, ordered 
government troops to “secure” the Armenian populated neighborhoods.5 In 
the meantime, unknown assailants stole the right arm of St. Gregory (a solid 
gold mold of the arm of the saint accredited with converting the pagan 
Armenians to Christianity in 301) from the grounds of the Armenian 
monastery complex.  
The events illustrate how multiple actors, from a variety of nation-states, 
used an Armenian affair to assert and compete for power. Concurrently, 
these events also reveal the extent to which members of the Armenian 
population challenged the scope of Lebanese, Soviet, and American state 
power by utilizing the Cold War sides to promote their own political and 
religious leaders. The battles for authority between Armenian, Soviet, and 
Lebanese (and also American as Chamoun’s government was largely 
supported by American intelligence and military services) politicians, 
religious leaders and journalists must, of course, be understood within the 
context of the Cold War. I contend that while the American and Soviet 
superpowers and their proxies were engaging in this “Armenian issue” in 
competition with one another, the efforts of Armenian religious officials to 
shape outcomes challenged the political prowess of the superpowers as they 
circumvented nation-state borders.  
 
BUILD-UP OF THE ELECTION 
While the multiple postponements indicated friction within the electoral 
committee, it was the visit of Catholicos Vasken of the Echmiadzin See in the 
Soviet Republic of Armenia, on February 3, 1956, that ignited tension 
amongst Armenians in Lebanon. While the Armenian population in Lebanon 
did not formally participate in the electoral process, many joined in planned 
and spontaneous public activities throughout the city, including lining the 
streets welcoming Vasken to Lebanon, following him en masse to his 
meetings with Armenian church officials and Lebanese state politicians. This 
unprecedented level of involvement--and its continuing media coverage--
revealed the presence and power of the Armenian population in Lebanon. 
This power was not limited to the assembled crowds at key locations such as 
the airport or the presidential palace, but in their ability to stop traffic, close 
places of business, delay the elections, and promote and publicize their 
victories and losses. The presence of the Armenian population attracted 
Soviet and American political powers to project their own competitions 
through them. 
The public presence of Armenians in Lebanon could be interpreted as 
“simultaneity,” in line with the works of Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick 
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Schiller.6  This articulation of power both reinforced and challenged the 
boundaries of the Lebanese nation-state. At the same time, transnational 
connections in the form of celebrating or opposing religious figures 
originating from outside of Lebanon (Before becoming the Echmiadzin 
Catholicos Vasken was the Armenian Prelate of Romania, while Zareh was 
the Archbishop of the Armenian community in Aleppo) did not negate the 
authority of the Lebanese nation-state. Armenians in Lebanon took to the 
streets as Lebanese citizens but also irrespective of a Lebanese identification. 
Vasken and Zareh, in turn, claimed a supranational ability, one that did not 
adhere to the boundaries of any particular nation-state, yet did not 
necessarily test its authority either. Accordingly understanding these 
struggles for power solely as supporting or hindering the apparatuses of the 
nation-state limits the actions of these individuals, groups, and institutions, 
while concurrently homogenizing them. Various actors--including state 
dignitaries, Armenian religious officials, and members of the Armenian 
population in Lebanon and beyond--fashioned multiple constructions of 
identification and belonging. The motivation of these disparate actors merits 
an examination beyond the classifications of a nation-state, diasporic group, 
and minority community.  
While I subscribe to the view that the rethinking of the boundaries of 
social life are necessary, the focus of Levitt and Glick Schiller’s interventions 
on migrants and the daily activities, routines, and institutions located in a 
destination country and transnationally do not completely transfer to the 
actions and events surrounding the 1956 Catholicosate election in Beirut.7 
While migrants often sought political refuge and vice versa, the history of 
Armenians in Lebanon diverges from this course. Armenians did not arrive 
as migrants but as refugees from the Ottoman Empire. In an effort to buttress 
the Christian population in Lebanon, the French mandatory government 
categorized them as citizens in 1923, and in so doing relinquished their legal 
connection to the lands of the Ottoman Empire that became contemporary 
Turkey. The labeling of the Armenians as migrants eclipses the actions of the 
Ottoman, French, and Lebanese governments and of the Republic of Turkey 
(which accepted this new legal status with the signing of the Treaty of 
Lausanne). In addition I contend that the category of “migrant” introduces a 
hierarchal ladder of Lebanese citizenship, insinuating a gradation of 
“nativeness.”  
The Echmiadzin See and the figure of Vasken also present an additional 
conflict. While Levitt and Glick Schiller do not constrain transnational 
connections to a homeland, allocating for “dispersed networks of family, 
compatriots, or persons who share a religious or ethnic identity,” they also do 
not accommodate the unfamiliarity between Vasken and the Armenian 
population in Lebanon or the purposeful positioning of the Echmiadzin See 
vis-à-vis the Armenian population in Lebanon. 8  The Catholicos of 
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Echmiadzin’s visit to the Cilician See in February 1956 was extraordinary. 
Vasken’s religious jurisdiction did not extend to the Armenian populations 
of Lebanon, or to most of the Armenian communities in the Middle East. 
The announcement of his impending visit (only days after the caretaker of 
the Cilician See announced the election would take place in February 1956), 
and the visit’s timing (days before the election was to take place), also 
exposed his trip’s connection to the election of the Cilician Catholicos.9 
“Simultaneity” does not account for this new and unprecedented relationship 
between the institution of the Echmiadzin See and the Armenian population 
in Lebanon.10  
Vasken’s visit to Lebanon and the Cilician See shows how the scope of 
the electoral conflict had extended far beyond the boundaries of the Cilician 
See and Lebanon. The discord spread to include the Echmiadzin See in the 
Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) of Armenia, and in so doing, brought in the 
Soviet Union as well. Vasken spoke to the Armenian Lebanese press, and 
accordingly to the Armenian population in Lebanon, via the Soviet news 
agency, TASS: “To the acting-Catholicos Archbishop Khoren: Because of our 
love of our church and because we have foresight to protect and affirm its 
unity and its utmost interests, we have decided to participate personally in 
the election and anointment of the Catholicos of the Cilician See.”11 This 
communication, from one See to another attempted to mute the complicated 
relationship between the two church authorities, the electoral processes, and 
the ability of the Sees to articulate internal and external tensions.12  
Both Catholicoi employed numerous proxies to communicate with one 
another, showcasing the multiple nation-states participating in this struggle 
for power.13 This communication involved Soviet authorities through TASS 
and Lebanese authorities through the Armenian Lebanese press, which was 
under the auspices of the Lebanese government’s press authority. In engaging 
with the Armenian press in Lebanon, the Armenian political parties were 
automatically enmeshed in the conflict, as almost every Armenian press 
outlet was either owned by or affiliated with an Armenian political party.14 
While these political parties (and their affiliated institutions) operated 
throughout the Middle East and beyond, their position in Lebanon, was 
particularly significant because their central committees were located in 
Beirut. 
The Cilician See had its own affiliated churches and prelacies not only in 
Lebanon, but also throughout the Middle East. Its authority transcended 
nation-state boundaries, similar to the Armenian political parties that 
enjoyed worldwide influence. The See’s seminary and monastery educated 
and ordained priests and bishops who were sent to Armenian communities 
throughout the Middle East. This seminary worked to secure the influence of 
the Cilician See in Lebanon in every parish, regardless of nation-state 
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borders. Leaders of Armenian parishes throughout the Middle East were fully 
integrated representatives of the Cilician See in Antelias and its system. 
Although this election has been understood as a local, circumscribed affair 
without considering the broader significance for the future trajectory of the 
Armenians in Lebanon and the Armenian Diaspora, I argue that this church 
election had wider importance. The election indicated the extent to which the 
power struggles for authority over the Armenian community in Lebanon 
took place across national boundaries, involving the political dynamics of 
multiple nation-state contexts and their respective power struggles with each 
other. Several nation-state authorities showcased their power through the 
position of the Catholicos in Lebanon, demonstrating the permeation of 
nation-state borders. At the same time, the Cilician See’s articulation of 
power both inside and outside Lebanon, often through the employment of 
state officials (who in turn formulated their own additional agendas) 
demonstrated its own ambitious drive.15 
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The growing involvement of actors from a variety of nation-states 
pushing opposing political ideologies through the election in Lebanon 
necessitates a review of the historical background of the precedence of 
multiple Sees in the Armenian Apostolic Church, and therefore competing 
centers of religious and political authority, and how the Cilician See came to 
be anchored in Beirut.  
Under the Ottoman and Russian empires, there were numerous 
Armenian Sees, or Catholicosates, each with its own jurisdiction and 
hierarchal system. The Cilician See, located in Sis (present city of Kozan), and 
the Akhtamar See (located near Van), were both within the territory of the 
Ottoman Empire, while the Echmiadzin See was located in the Russian 
Empire. The Cilician See was established, along with the Kingdom of Cilicia 
after the fall of the Kingdom of Ani in the end of the 11th century, in Sis (in 
Southern Anatolia, present day Kozan). It had its own Catholicos, and under 
its jurisdiction, lines of archbishops, bishops, priests, and their parishes. 
Depending on the historical moment, they were in contact with other Sees, 
Constantinople/Istanbul, and Jerusalem. 
In addition to these Sees, there were two patriarchates, one in Jerusalem, 
and the other in Istanbul. These patriarchates were doctrinally subservient to 
the authority of the Sees, even though they enjoyed a degree of autonomy 
over their own affairs and played an important role within their communities 
and beyond. Due to their locations, size of their congregations, and the 
political status assigned to them by the Ottoman authorities as official 
representatives of the Armenian community to the Ottoman state, these two 
patriarchates played powerful intermediary roles between the community 
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they were made to represent and the state. The Patriarchate in Istanbul 
represented the Armenian millet to the Ottoman government in the imperial 
capital.16 The Patriarchate in Jerusalem not only represented the Armenians 
in the Armenian quarter of the city and throughout Palestine, but also was 
responsible for guarding the Armenian niches in the churches of the Holy 
Sepulchre in Jerusalem, and the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem.  
 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CILICIA AND ECHMIADZIN  
The relationship between the Sees and patriarchates permeated imperial, 
and later nation-state borders. While the Sees were recognized as Armenian 
community representatives by imperial (and later nation-state) powers, 
neither See sought Ottoman/Russian state approval in formulating 
relationships with one another. In this way, they acted as supra-state 
structures, using the authority given to them by the state, while possibly 
subverting the state’s authority. While rare, Sees and patriarchates made 
agreements that did not necessarily forward the political line of the states that 
housed them.17  
In addition, they each had their own structure and degree of autonomy, 
and were known to participate little in each other’s internal affairs. First, 
there were the practical issues caused by the 800 kilometers separating them, 
and second, they operated from within two different empires, the Cilician See 
within the Ottoman Empire, and Echmiadzin in the Russian Empire. Even 
their congregations would have had difficulty communicating with one 
another, as many Armenians from villages in South Eastern Turkey under the 
jurisdiction of the Cilician See spoke only Turkish, while areas under the 
leadership of Echmiadzin spoke Armenian and Russian.18  
The formation of the nation-state further constricted the movement and 
communication between the two Sees with the imposition of the “national” 
borders, and engendered additional distinctions based on concepts of 
citizenship. And yet, the two Sees surmounted this new categorization and 
coordinated their efforts during the repatriation movement of 1946-1948, the 
organized population transfer of thousands of Armenians worldwide to the 
“homeland,” the Soviet Republic of Armenia.19 
The abilities of the Catholicos of Echmiadzin to practice and perform 
religious rites were also disproportionate to that of the Catholicos of the 
Cilician See. Armenians in Beirut were categorized as Christian according to 
the sectarian dimensions of the state making the Catholicos of Cilician See 
the officially recognized political and religious leader of the Armenians to the 
Lebanese state by 1946. In addition, this authority extended into the realm of 
personal rights, including marriage, divorce, and death procedures.  
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This relationship between the two Sees changed dramatically by the early 
1950s-- partly because of the altered Armenian political landscape in 
Lebanon and the increasing competition of the Cold War.20 The coordinated 
efforts of repatriation were long past.21 With the drastic reduction of the 
leftist Hnchak and centrist Ramgavar party rosters, most of whose members 
repatriated to Soviet Armenia, and the relatively unaffected membership 
numbers of its own party due to their reticence regarding the repatriation 
movement, the nationalist/rightist Dashnak party was able to consolidate its 
prowess within the community of Armenians in Lebanon and the larger 
Lebanese community. This power was especially apparent in the Lebanese 
political realm, as it was mostly Dashnak members represented the Armenian 
community in parliament. In addition, the government of Lebanon at the 
time, led by President Camille Chamoun, was ardently anti-communist, and 
was thus supported financially (and later militarily) by the United States. The 
natural alliance between the Dashnak party, by the 1950s fervently anti-
communist, and the government of Camille Chamoun, buttressed the party’s 
domination within the Armenian community. That acting Catholicos 
Archbishop Khoren had a close relationship to Dashnak officials and 
President Chamoun guaranteed the selection of a like-minded Catholicos. 
These alliances created an opportune moment to finally hold the election. 
The relationships between the Cilician See, the Dashnak party, and the 
Lebanese government also showcased the multiple authorities that were 
involved with the events surrounding the election, all operating for a variety 
of reasons. 
Immediately after Archbishop Khoren’s announcement that the elections 
would finally be held in February 1956, the Catholicos of Echmiadzin, 
Vasken, announced that he would be present at the elections. It was the first 
time the Catholicos of Echmiadzin had been granted permission to leave the 
Soviet Republic of Armenia. Vasken had become part of the infrastructure of 
the Soviet Union: not only were his movements monitored, but his very 
election, as well as his sermons, were sanctioned by the USSR. Nevertheless, 
this can also be seen as an attempt of the Armenian leader to secure his 
power outside Soviet borders, in effect superseding the authority imposed 
upon him by the Soviet authorities. His involvement--even at the behest of 
the Soviet Union--demonstrated an attempt to reposition his power outside 
of the USSR and in the region of the Middle East. Acting Catholicos 
Archbishop Khoren’s announcement forced both Sees to confront the issue 
of hierarchy within the Armenian Apostolic Church and identified the 1956 
election of Catholicos of the Cilician See as the medium by which struggle for 
power would take place.  
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VASKEN’S ARRIVAL 
No official action of Vasken could occur outside the context of the 
USSR’s larger policies vis-à-vis the Cold War. It was Soviet authorities that 
fixed his travel route (Vasken flew from Yerevan to Beirut via extended stops 
in Moscow and Paris where he met Soviet government officials).22 Once in 
Beirut, however, Vasken was 
greeted by tens of thousands of 
Armenians lining the streets from 
the airport to the monastery in 
Antelias, approximately 15 
kilometers away.  
Did Vasken shift from a 
Soviet authority into an Armenian 
one on this journey? It was 
unclear where the jurisdiction of 
Soviet authority ended and the 
Armenian began. However, the 
Armenian public’s support of 
Vasken as either (or both) a Soviet 
or Armenian official challenged 
the authority of the Lebanese 
nation-state. In addition the 
spectacle of public support in 
Lebanon challenged his role as a Soviet affiliate. 
Armenian political party figures, newspapers, and members of the public 
also participated in the spectacle. Armenian schools were closed, while the 
established “Committee to 
Welcome Catholicos 
Vasken” encouraged 
students to line the streets 
from the National Museum 
(of Lebanon) to the bridges 
that lead into Borj 
Hamoud, “out of respect 
for” to the Catholicos. 23 
This directive was 
publicized by the Armenian 
newspapers along with five 
instructions. Number three 
announced, “The only flag 
 
Figure 2: Crowds lining the streets welcoming Vasken to 
Lebanon from the USSR. Zartonk, 14 February 1956. Photo 
taken by author. 
 
Figure 1: Crowds gathered at the Lebanese airport 
welcoming Vasken from the USSR. Zartonk, 14 
February 1956. Photo taken by author.  
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that is permitted to be held is the flag of the Lebanese state.”24 While the 
directive did not elaborate on the significance of alternative flags, it deemed 
the Lebanese flag the appropriate symbol of representation for the Armenian 
population in Lebanon to welcome Vasken.  
Armenians in Lebanon waved the Lebanese flag for Vasken, which sent 
numerous messages about national affiliation. The Lebanese national flag 
indicated a certain kind of authority, which was considered distinct from an 
Armenian, Soviet, or political party flag. For the Armenian citizens of 
Lebanon, the Lebanese flag became an Armenian symbol demonstrating the 
approval of Vasken, an official of the Echmiadzin See, and an extension of 
Soviet authority. At the same time, the flag could have also been seen as a 
challenge to Soviet authority, as the symbol of the Lebanese state.25  
The actions of both Vasken and the Armenians who welcomed him 
complicated the bounded notions of the nation-state. Where the authorities 
of the Lebanese and Soviet nation-states began, ended, and overlapped were 
ambiguous, as was the national identifications of the Armenians in Lebanon. 
In addition, the boundaries of the authorities of the Echmiadzin and Cilician 
Sees were consistently being renegotiated. Even though Armenians were 
participating in the spectacle, and thereby legitimizing Vasken’s (and the 
Soviet Union’s) authority, their status as Lebanese citizens and their 
continued support of the Cilician See and its institutions demonstrated 
otherwise. They still attended schools run by the Cilician See and their 
marriage, divorce, baptism, and death rites continued to be performed by the 
clergy of that See. The Armenian Apostolic representatives to the Lebanese 
parliament-- regardless of political party affiliation-- still sought the 
benediction of the Catholicos of the Cilician See. 
While thousands of Armenians did line the streets to welcome Vasken, 
not everyone took part in the celebration. By speaking against Vasken’s 
impending involvement in the electoral process, the electoral committee of 
the Cilician See challenged Vasken and the Soviet Union’s authority. 
Nevertheless, the simulated warmth continued through the morning of 
February 14, 1956, the very day of the election. Acting Catholicos Archbishop 
Khoren opened the electoral meeting with a “friendly” invitation for Vasken 
to speak.26 Vasken accepted, and in turn offered his personal well wishes from 
the Echmiadzin See to the Cilician See. 27  He then described what he 
considered to be the role of the elections, “to aid in the advancement of 
Armenian diasporic church life.”28 In his address to the electoral committee, 
Vasken also stressed how his presence was an opportunity “to further 
strengthen the life of our churches and the national life in these areas.”29 By 
connecting himself to “these areas” (presumably those areas under the 
jurisdiction of the Cilician See” Vasken extended his authority from the 
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Echmiadzin See in Soviet Armenia to Lebanon, circumventing the authorities 
of Soviet Armenia, the USSR, Lebanon, and of the Cilician See.  
Continuing in this vein, he announced the convening-- that week-- of an 
emergency meeting of The Council of Bishops in Jerusalem.30 In so doing, 
Vasken assumed the guardianship of “diasporic” church life, and questioned 
the authority of the Cilician See and its necessity as an institution separate 
from the Echmiadzin See. Was Vasken placing the Cilician See under his 
realm, and possibly under Soviet control as well, given his status as a citizen 
of the USSR? Acting Catholicos Khoren, thwarted Vasken’s attempt at 
classifying the Armenian Sees and adjourned the meeting, rescheduling the 
elections for the morning of February 20, 1956. 31  
But how did Vasken, in Beirut, have the power to call for the emergency 
meeting and order it to be held in Jerusalem, in yet another city over (or in) 
which he did not have any jurisdiction, religious or otherwise? In calling for 
the meeting in Beirut, and in decreeing that it would take place in Jerusalem, 
he challenged the authority of the Lebanese and Jordanian state officials.32 In 
addition, Vasken’s “blessing” challenged the authority of the Cilician See. 
After all, Vasken’s jurisdiction extended from the monastery at Echmiadzin, 
within the borders of the Soviet Armenian Republic, and most notably not 
from the complex of the Cilician See in Antelias, Lebanon. 
Vasken attempted to reinforce this authority by meeting with the head of 
the Lebanese state, President Camille Chamoun. The photographs printed in 
the following day’s Lebanese papers on February 15, 1956 were an affront to 
the authority of the Cilician See. 
 
 
Figure 3: President Chamoun meeting Vasken at the Presidential Palace. Aztag, 15 February 1956. Photo 
taken by author. 
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Vasken used the Lebanese state to demonstrate his own importance to 
the Armenian population in Lebanon while challenging the authority of 
acting Catholicos Khoren and the Cilician See. Chamoun’s statement 
following the photos offered yet another interpretation of authority. His 
words challenged the boundaries of both Vasken’s and Zareh’s authority. 
President Chamoun declared, “Please consider yourself in your own home, 
since it is without exaggeration when I say Lebanon is a second Armenia.” 
While Chamoun’s statement could have been interpreted as a gesture of 
friendship and goodwill between Lebanon and the USSR, it also 
simultaneously enveloped all Armenians, placing them under Chamoun’s 
tutelage in the state of Lebanon. 33  The President of Lebanon further 
concluded his remarks with a final wish: “I hope that tomorrow’s elections 
are held under normal circumstances and that I am given the honor to share 
in your happiness tomorrow evening and will have the pleasure to receive 
you and the Cilician See’s Catholicos-elect thereafter.” 34  In so doing, 
Chamoun reoriented the outcome of the election as reaffirmation of his 
authority. After all, not only was the election to take place within Lebanon, 
but also once the election was over, Chamoun would “officially” receive him, 
as if to offer his “final” approval. This exertion of authority was directed at 
Vasken, Soviet authorities, the Cilician See, and the Armenian population.  
Vasken and the Soviet Union also attempted to extend their authority 
over the congregations of the Cilician See by the performance of religious 
rites. Vasken officiated mass and gave the sermon at the compound of the 
Cilician See on Sunday, February 19, 1956, the day before the rescheduled 
elections. While the announcement that he would officiate mass was printed 
on the front page of all of Lebanon’s Armenian newspapers, Aztag, the 
newspaper affiliated with the Dashnak Party, did not cover the event.35 By not 
covering Vasken’s Sunday’s service, Aztag signaled its disapproval. The 
newspaper also became more persistent in attacking the presence of Vasken, 
labeling him as a foreigner, a pawn of Societ authorities, and accordingly 
insinuating he was not privy to the goings on in Lebanon and to the 
Armenian populations there.36  
 
ELECTION AND DEPARTURE 
The events that followed Vasken’s officiating of the Armenian mass and 
his meeting with President Chamoun were anything but friendly. Having not 
yet secured a visa from the Jordanian authorities to visit Jerusalem, and yet 
aware that the elections would take place and that Zareh would indeed be 
elected, Vasken left for Paris. Zareh, a staunch opponent of communism and 
the Soviet manifestation of the Armenian Republic, was elected Catholicos on 
February 19, 1956, under the protection of the Lebanese national army.37 
!
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In an attempt to annul his selection, a group of about one hundred 
women took over the St. Gregory Cathedral within the grounds of the 
Cilician See’s complex.38 Archbishops, including acting Catholicos Khoren 
were attacked and hospitalized.39 Violent clashes erupted between supporters 
and opponents of Zareh.40 These divisions were codified in the press as 
masses took to the streets in support or in protest of the election. A general 
strike was called for in the Armenian neighborhoods, and stores and schools 
closed in an attempt to deescalate the conflict. 
In a matter of days, authorities of various nation-states converged 
through the Catholicos election 
of the Cilician See. The 
Lebanese state guaranteed the 
election of Zareh by sending its 
troops to “guard” the complex 
from those who opposed his 
selection. Numerous state 
dignitaries from Great Britain, 
France, and the United States 
offered their congratulations 
while officials from the Soviet 
Union and countries of the 
Warsaw Pact shared their 
dismay. Vasken declared the 
entire process illegal from Paris. 
The Jordanian authorities’ 
refusal to grant Vasken a visa to 
Jerusalem, demonstrated the 
authority of the Jordanian state 
and the tightening of the 
borders of the nation-state.41 In 
turn, when the Egyptian 
government granted visas to 
Vasken and his entourage so 
that they could hold their 
emergency Council of Bishops in Cairo, it demonstrated his influence in the 
Egyptian arena.42   
Egypt and Jordan’s reactions to the election and their differing treatment 
of Vasken were connected to their relationships with the USSR and the 
United States during the Cold War.43 Both superpowers used their proxies to 
forward their own political agenda while demonstrating their authority to 
one another. When President Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser of Egypt welcomed 
Vasken, he was also receiving a Soviet official. Similarly, when Jordanian 
 
Figure 4: The scene at the Cilician See monastery complex 
on election day. The upper left corner shows two armed 
Lebanese officers overlooking the courtyard. Zartonk, 23 
February 1956. Photo taken by author.  
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government authorities refused to give a visa to Vasken, they were acting 
against a Soviet official.  
While many of these aforementioned authorities demonstrated the 
power of nation-state borders, they also brought to light their permeability. 
When Vasken called the entire process illegal from Paris, he (re)claimed 
authority from the capital of one nation-state, France, within a national-space 
of another, Lebanon. The permeability of nation-state borders was probably 
best detected when the religious relics of the Cilician See, housed within the 
monastery complex in Antelias, went “missing” the day before the elections, 
only to be “found” a year later, in Jerusalem.44 
The involvement of authorities from a variety of nation-states 
demonstrated that this election was not merely an Armenian affair. Rather, 
the 1956 election of the Catholicos of the Cilician See became an 
international contest to establish authority. In addition to the power struggles 
that the global actors engaged in, the election also provided the opportunity 
for Armenian authorities in Lebanon to contend for power over the 
Armenian community. This election showcased local, national, transnational, 
and global actors and their struggles for power over authority.  
 
MABROUK! 
While Vasken and his Soviet and Armenian entourage were in Cairo, 
Zareh began to gather support from the Lebanese and Syrian governments. 
These governments legitimized Zareh’s election, and inserted (or further 
involved, in the case of Lebanon) their authorities within the power struggle. 
Three days after the election, on February 22, 1956, Zareh met with the 
President of Lebanon, Camille Chamoun.45 Similar photo opportunities were 
taken with Syrian President Shukri Al-Quwatli and other Syrian 
governmental figures in the following days, all covered in the press.46  
In participating in these meetings, President Chamoun and President 
Shukri placed their governments’ support behind the election, and upheld the 
autonomy of the Cilician See against any meddling by the Echmiadzin See 
and the USSR. While the Lebanese and Syrian governments backed the 
Cilician See, they also correspondingly levied their authority upon the See 
and the Armenians that were under its tutelage. And yet, it was the Cilician 
See that enlisted these powers to defend itself and distinguish it from what it 
deemed a Soviet intervention. This presented additional complexities for 
understanding the power struggles surrounding this election. Syria, an 
outside government, in upholding the autonomy of the Cilician See, extended 
its own authority over the institution, located within the nation-state of 
Lebanon. At the same time the Cilician See legitimized its own power--by 
mobilizing Syrian state power--against an institution located in yet another 
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national space, the USSR. In so doing, both Syria and the Cilician See 
challenged Lebanon’s ability to exercise sovereign control over “internal” 
affairs, while employing one another to claim additional power for 
themselves. 
Two 
photographs of 
Zareh’s visit to 
President 
Chamoun were 
printed in the 
February 23, 
1956 issues of 
Aztag, an-
Nahar, and The 
Daily Star (and 
most notably 
not in Ararad 
or Zartonk, two 
papers 
vehemently opposed to the election of Zareh) publicizing the Lebanese 
government’s approval of the election.  
 The first of the two photos showed a smiling Zareh and an equally 
jovial Camille Chamoun at the presidential palace sharing a drink. While the 
atmosphere suggested amiability, as if Zareh and Chamoun had a long 
established relationship, Zareh was dressed in his official religious garb. This 
dress, including the black headpiece worn by bishops and archbishops, 
complete with gold medallions bearing the crest of the Cilician See, indicated 
that the meeting was being held in an official capacity. Aztag described their 
conversation: “The Catholicos-elect and the Honorable President exchanged 
views and had an intimate and tender conversation with one another.”47 This 
photo opportunity represented the two men as equals-- two elected, and 
therefore legitimate, leaders of their respected flocks.48 By withholding both 
the names of Zareh and Chamoun (and by identifying Zareh as Catholicos), 
Aztag implied that the particularities of the identities of these two figures are 
irrelevant. What is paramount, is that the Catholicos, and the President, met 
with one another. Whoever these two men are, they, ipso facto, were the 
leaders of their communities. Their pictures together, along with the official 
ceremonies, instantiated their mandate.  
On the route home, when the motorcade passed the Armenian 
neighborhoods, Aztag reported that community members were gathered 
along the road, “in respect, holding Lebanese flags.”49 Here, the holding of a 
Lebanese flag symbolized the Cilician See, in addition to what it had signified 
!
Figure 5: Photo taken of newly elected Zareh and President Chamoun. Aztag 
23 February 1956. Photo taken by author. 
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just a few weeks earlier when held to welcome Vasken from the airport. By 
waving this Lebanese national symbol, these flag-bearers assert the authority 
of Lebanon via the election of the Cilician See. In so doing, the flag-bearers 
inserted the Lebanese state within the authority of the Cilician See.  
 
WITH BEST WISHES 
The presidents of Lebanon and Syria were not the only figures who 
participated in the fashioning of their authority and that of the Cilician See in 
the days following the election. Aztag reported, “From yesterday morning 
onward, numerous state officials from all over Lebanon went to Antelias to 
offer their congratulations to the newly elected Catholicos.”50 Zareh was also 
visited by the president of the American University of Beirut and various 
scholars of different universities.51 This coverage linked the newly elected 
Catholicos to Lebanese institutions, while affirming his legitimacy as the 
spiritual, and political, leader of the Lebanese Armenian community. 
On February 26, 1956, Aztag ran a front-page article publicizing the 
Archbishop of Canterbury’s congratulatory remarks offered to Zareh. This 
same article invoked multiple sources of authority: the Archbishop of 
Canterbury as well as “these various other countries, including France, the 
United States, Great Britain, and Turkey” who had sent their well wishes and 
congratulations.52 All of these words of congratulations acted to reinforce the 
Cilician See’s claims of authority upon the Armenian community of 
Lebanon. In addition, the See paraded this multi-national and multi-
vocational support and projected it outwards, towards the Armenian 
congregations of the Cilician See situated outside of Lebanon and towards the 
Echmiadzin See in the USSR. At the same time, telegrams of best wishes 
could also be read as external players--from a variety of nation-states--
staking a claim in an increasingly communist vs. anti-communist story by 
way of the Armenian church election. Those actors that congratulated Zareh 
instantaneously pledged and/or reaffirmed their association with the US, 
while those that did not at best maintained a non-alignment.  
 
OUTSIDE THE REALM OF THE EXPECTED 
The political actors involved in delineating authority were not only 
Chamoun, Vasken, Zareh, or the various forms of Soviet and American 
representations by way of congratulatory telegrams and visits. In the 
aftermath of Jordan’s refusal to grant Vasken a visa to Jerusalem, Egypt 
demonstrated its authority in convening the meeting within its borders.53 In 
so doing, it also participated in the power struggle in the aftermath of the 
Catholicos election. Egypt’s involvement was surprising, because unlike 
Jordan and Turkey, it did not house an Armenian Patriarchate, or a 
significant Armenian population.54 Egypt’s connection to the election and its 
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aftermath showcased the investment of various nation-states in this 
purportedly internal Armenian election. 
 
Vasken’s 
presence in 
Cairo also 
demonstrated 
his own 
authority and 
that it extended 
outside the 
Soviet Union. 
Aztag reported, 
“The church 
courtyard was 
completely 
packed and had 
a celebratory 
atmosphere. 
Vasken spent 
the entire day meeting and receiving both Armenian community members 
and dignitaries.”55 His ability to garner this attention even after--or in spite 
of--the election of Zareh also reminded all parties involved that the 
boundaries of authority were not settled.  
Vasken also visited the President of Egypt, Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser. Similar 
to his approach with President Chamoun three weeks earlier, Vasken first 
expressed his gratitude that he had the opportunity to visit “this amazing 
country, and meet Egypt’s refined people.” 56  He immediately thereafter 
recognized “the bravery and genius” of its leader, Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser, who 
“wholeheartedly has always supported Armenian matters.”57 
In response, ‘Abd al-Nasser expressed his gratitude for the Armenian 
community, emphasizing their place within the nation-state of Egypt. 
“Armenians are not foreigners, but are children of this country. Through 
their hard-work and commitment they have won-over the Egyptian people 
and its government and excelled in the country.”58 While ‘Abd al-Nasser does 
not clarify why Armenians of Egypt would be qualified as outsiders in the 
first place, nor how they would have been categorized if they had not been 
deemed “hardworking and committed,” his affirmation of the community 
claimed them under his country’s control.  
And yet, ‘Abd al-Nasser also acknowledged Vasken’s authority by 
meeting with him. Where the boundaries of that authority are, however, 
remained unclear. After being invited to the Soviet Republic of Armenia by 
!
Figure 6: Vasken pictured at his arrival to Cairo. Zartonk, 29 February 1956. 
Photo taken by author.  
!
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Vasken, ‘Abd al-Nasser replied, “It is with great pleasure that I accept your 
invitation. If I go to Moscow and if given the opportunity, I promise to visit 
you and Echmiadzin, because I really enjoy visiting religious centers.”59  
In this brief exchange, the Egyptian President Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser 
aligned himself with the Soviet Union by hosting their representative, 
Vasken, and by allowing him to hold the meeting of the Council of Bishops 
in Cairo when he was prevented from doing so in Jerusalem. And yet, even in 
welcoming Vasken I to Cairo, ‘Abd al-Nasser contained Vasken’s authority 
within the boundaries of the Echmiadzin See, and confined it to religious 
matters. Furthermore, ‘Abd al-Nasser made the proclamation that 
Armenians had always been, and would continue to be, an essential part of 
Egypt’s fabric. While ‘Abd al-Nasser publicly affirmed Vasken as an 
Armenian representative, he also asserted the Egyptian state’s authority over 
the Armenians in Egypt. This exchange illustrates how these figures both 
recognized, and attempted to limit, each other’s power.  
 
FLINCHED DEXTER OF THE SAINT AND THE USES OF THE 
STRUGGLES FOR POWER 
The traveling bishops and archbishops were not the only ones 
negotiating limits of sovereign control within multiple nation-states. On 
March 24, 1956, Armenian papers began to report on the theft of a handful of 
religious relics, including the Holy Right Arm of St. Gregory, from within the 
monastery of the Cilician See. Approximately one month after the elections 
of Zareh, this golden arm, along with other treasures, was revealed to be 
missing. Because the right arm had been connected to the glory and survival 
of the See, it was understood as the incarnation of its very power. More 
pragmatically, it was to be used to anoint a newly elected Catholicos. Without 
it, those opposed to the selection Zareh argued, his election was worthless. 
The robbery, and the ensuing debates over the relic, served as an extension of 
the tense and controversial Catholicos election and became another site of 
struggle by authorities vying for power.  
The relics had a history of transport through space. The golden arm of 
the right hand of St. Gregory (atch, in Armenian) was moved to Cilicia when 
the Kingdom of Ani fell in the 11th century. It then was transported to 
Echmiadzin when the Kingdom of Cilicia fell in 1441, only to be brought 
back to Sis (contemporary Kozan) a few years later.60 During the organized 
massacres of the Armenian millet of World War I, the atch, along with other 
relics, was transported by ox-cart from Sis to Aleppo. Once Catholicos Sahag 
had secured the Antelias compound as the home of Cilician See, these relics, 
including the atch, were brought to Beirut. 61  Their movement in 1956 
involved a new set of authorities, those of various nation-states. The Cilician 
See was located within Lebanon, and relics were smuggled across the nation-
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state border. This event was another illustration of multiple authorities 
engaging directly with each other and within the pages of the Armenian 
newspapers in Lebanon to demonstrate their own legitimacy and power.  
 
RECONDITIONING THE NEED FOR THE ARM 
When it became clear that the golden arm would not be returned to the 
Cilician See immediately, Zareh and other religious figures of the Cilician See 
attempted to distance the atch as a representation of their authority. Aztag, 
the Armenian daily of the nationalist/rightist Dashnak party and the outlet 
most supportive of Zareh, ran a series of articles written by priests and 
bishops, dedicated to the history of the Armenian Sees and their often-
contentious relationships with one another. In an attempt to discredit the 
Echmiadzin See and Vasken, these religious authorities declared the See a 
house of thieves. By detailing past stories of insurrections, defections, and 
most notably for their purposes, theft, the paper implicated Echmiadzin, and 
by extension Vasken, in the robbery. In one such example, “The Migration of 
the Armenian Catholicos Seat,” written by Father Der Melkonian in the 
March 21, 1956 issue, Aztag asserted that because Echmiadzin had meddled 
before (albeit hundreds of years ago), it was most certainly doing so again, 
and would continue to do so in the future. This educational, “historical essay” 
maintained that the Cilician See persevered in the past, not due to a golden 
arm of a saint, but rather, through the blessings of God.62  
Father Der Melkonian tracked what he considered to be the Echmiadzin 
See’s pathological tendency for treachery. 63  By consistently telling and 
retelling events from as early as 1443, Der Melkonian maintained that the 
actions of the Echmiadzin See were innately deviant. Not surprisingly, he 
dedicated a great deal of the article to one particular episode, the theft in 1443 
of the Right Arm of St. Gregory from Sis and how it resurfaced in 
Echmiadzin.64  
While Der Melkonian attacked the authority of the Echmiadzin See, he 
also distanced the authority of the Cilician See from the atch. Der Melkonian 
closed the article with the words of the late Bishop Papken who “devoted his 
time to researching and writing about the dogmatic and emotional 
importance of the atch.”65 Through the expertise of Bishop Papken, Der 
Melkonian delineated the authority of the atch. “The so-called arm of St. 
Gregory is not regarded as a holy relic within [Armenian] history. In fact, the 
narrated tales that surround the atch, connecting it with the Cilician See, 
consistently consider the atch to be symbol, or remembrance, of His [God’s] 
Illumination. Under no circumstances, however, is it considered to be 
connected to the existence of faith, hierarchal validity, or positioning [of the 
See].”66 This treatment separated he atch from authority, and consolidated 
the power of the Cilician See.  
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Der Melkonian’s article was particularly useful for Aztag and the Cilician 
See to convey their position on the authority of the atch to their readership. 
He provided examples of at least two Catholicoi consecrations that took place 
without the presence of the atch, and detailed one consecration that was 
declared invalid on dogmatic grounds, even though the atch was present. 
“Thus,” Der Melkonian concludes, “in reality, the Illuminator’s atch is 
neither obligatory in the rule of the See nor in its governance.”67 This article 
also separated the presence of the atch from the authority of Zareh and the 
Cilician See just in case it is never “found.” Here, the lack of the golden arm, 
once a representation of authority for the Cilician See, was made to 
demonstrate that the See did not need an object to affirm the institution’s 
faith in God. In so doing, it raised the caliber of its power vis-à-vis its 
opponents who, shortsightedly, deemed its presence necessary.  
In the March 22, 1956 issue, the day after Der Melkonian’s article was 
printed, Aztag reported on Zareh’s sermon, which echoed both the spirit of 
Der Melkonian’s article and its precedence of travelling across borders. In 
“The Moving Sermon of Zareh,” Aztag quoted Zareh: “This is not the first 
time that there have been thefts. Similar thefts have occurred before. The atch 
can go missing. But no one can take the Illuminator’s atch from its church 
and it cannot be stolen. I have faith that the atch [and other treasures that 
were stolen] will be found soon in their place, in this monastery. But still, I 
wish to pray not that we find them, but that this will be done through God’s 
grace, and that the culprits return and put them in their place, at this 
church.”68  Zareh delicately called for the return of the atch while asserting its 
independence from his authority. 
 
FOUND! 
On 31 March 31 1957, over a year after its initial disappearance, the atch 
was found. Aztag announced, “The Holy Atch that was stolen from the 
Catholicosate is found: Archbishop Khoren arrives tomorrow, Sunday, at 
noon with the Holy Relics at the airport at Khalde.”69 The details of the theft, 
however, including how the relics were stolen, where they were found, under 
what circumstances, or how they were delivered to Archbishop Khoren, were 
not provided. 70  Aztag only disclosed that the relics were found “in a 
neighboring country,” a claim that it accredited to the Lebanese French daily, 
L’Orient.71 There was no doubt that the golden right arm crossed nation-state 
borders. In fact, nation-states were unable to contain the Armenian struggle 
for power within their borders. Armenian authorities manipulated political 
platforms and ideologies of multiple states to bolster their own power.  
The very following issue, April 2, 1957, Aztag covered the arrival of the 
relics, in “The Stolen Atches Yesterday Arrived in Beirut.” Aztag’s front page 
was filled with pictures of Catholicos Zareh joyfully raising the arm to bless 
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members of the community who lined the streets from the airport until the 
monastery.72 Many of them were miming the form of the golden arm- their 
arms raised with their palms open and their thumb bent slightly towards the 
right.73  
In the same issue, it also finally provided details of the theft. “With names 
withheld in order to protect certain identities,” the paper described both the 
robbery and the smuggling: On February 19, 1956, once it became clear that 
the election would take place and that Zareh would be selected, Archbishop 
Karekin, the Prelate of Istanbul, and Archbishop Diran orchestrated the 
burglary as an attempt to invalidate or at least postpone the election.74 “That 
very night,” Aztag recounted, “cold hands stole the case of the golden atches 
from their room and smuggled them out of the monastery to Beirut, to the 
home of one of the collaborators.”75 The following day, when word spread 
within the religious circles about the theft and as rumors escalated that there 
will be door to door inspections of houses, the thieves decided that the atches 
“must vanish.”76 The two collaborators (one of whom housed the stolen case 
at his house) gave them to Patriarch Yeghishe, Prelate of Jerusalem, with the 
“demand” that they be taken outside of Lebanon to Jerusalem.77   
According to Aztag, Patriarch Yeghishe took the relics to Jerusalem and 
safeguarded them outside of the monastery of St. James in the Armenian 
Quarter, “always thinking that one day he would be able to officially return 
them.”78 When there was another attempt to steal the atch, this time from 
Jerusalem, Aztag reported that Patriarch Yeghishe engaged in a formal 
disagreement with “the authorities of Jerusalem” “believing the rightful 
holder of the golden arm and its associated treasures was the See of Cilicia, 
which must be returned to Beirut.”79 The article does not denote if they are 
Armenian authorities but took this detail for granted, as if no other authority 
would exist in Jerusalem at that time that would be pertinent to such an issue. 
In its exposé, Aztag maintained that it was in these last few weeks that the 
Prelate of Jerusalem decided that the time had come to return the relics.80 
“And so he sent word to Catholicos Zareh in Antelias to send a representative 
first to Amman and then to Jerusalem to receive the Golden Arm.81 
The disappearance and reappearance of the golden arm expand the 
notions of nation-state borders and boundaries of authority. The movement 
of smuggling the atch out of one border (from the monastery at Antelias), 
and subsequently transporting it within and across others, was at the 
discretion of religious figures and not necessarily the national spaces that 
contain them. Figures dart in and out of multiple national borders while 
attempting to consolidate their own authorities as well as the authority of 
their national institutions (such as the Cilician See, or the Patriarchate of 
Jerusalem), while accommodating physical and symbolic borders.  
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The spectacle, while celebrating the reappearance of the atch, also 
demonstrated both the flexibility and persistence of nation-state borders and 
their authority. The atch was smuggled from Lebanon to Jerusalem, but its 
return was sanctioned by Jordanian and Lebanese state authorities who 
authorized the transport and pick up of the arm. It also firmly placed power--
literally--in the hands of the Catholicos of Cilicia and legitimized his position 
over the Lebanese Armenian and Cilician See community. This action 
competed with other manifestations of power, such as Jordan reinforcing its 
control of Jerusalem, Moscow demonstrated their rule upon the Echmiadzin 
See and Soviet Armenia, and Chamoun’s consolidation of power over the 
Cilician See at Antelias. The sight also mimicked the scene of celebration that 
was held 14 months earlier not to reproduce an ode to Vasken but to reaffirm 
the glory of Zareh and the Cilician See.  
The return, and its 
associated coverage, 
also highlighted the 
authority of the states 
that aided in the 
homecoming, affirming 
the control certain 
leaders exercised over 
the territory of the 
nation-state. While 
Archbishop Khoren was 
given the order to 
collect the golden arm 
from Catholicos Zareh, 
he had to wait until the 
Jordanian authorities in 
its capital, Amman, 
granted him permission 
to travel and collect the relic.82 His arrival in Beirut, together with the 25,000 
gathered to welcome the golden arm, had to be sanctioned by Lebanese 
national authorities. The closing down of the arrival hall for Catholicos Zareh 
also did not occur on his order, but on the order of the Lebanese government 
authorities who controlled the airport. And yet, the entire spectacle did serve 
to trumpet the power and victory of the Cilician See.  
 
APPENDING THE LIMB 
With the return of the atch, the autonomy of the See of Cilicia--at least 
with regards to the Echmiadzin See--was established. Aztag also maintained 
the Cilician See’s authority in various nation-states. In “The Bewilderment of 
the Thieves of the Atch,” printed on April 4, 1957, Aztag stated, “The 
 
Figure 7: Zareh with the recovered gold atch, using it to bless the 
people gathered to celebrate its homecoming back in Beirut. Aztag, 
2 April 1957. Photo taken by author. 
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Armenians of Cilicia’s other parishes share in the true happiness of the 
Armenian People. Many hurry to Beirut to thank and congratulate the 
Catholicos and to see the Holy Atches. Antelias has become a place of 
pilgrimage since Sunday, where the Right Arm of St. Gregory the Illuminator 
blesses all its shepherds.” 83  The authority of the See in Lebanon was 
reinforced through the actions of parishioners who traveled to Antelias that 
day from a different nation-states including Syria (from Aleppo, Damascus, 
Jezireh, among others), Jordan (from Amman and Jerusalem), and Cyprus.84  
 The Cilician See as a site of pilgrimage also challenged the firmness 
of nation-state borders. Its churches and schools located in Cyprus, Greece, 
Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Iran maintained the authority of the Cilician See in 
Lebanon. On the first Feast of St. Gregory the Illuminator (also the namesake 
of the church within the monastery) after the return of the atch, on April 9, 
1957, Zareh announced that there will be the Blessing of the Holy Muron, or 
chrism, in the fall of that year.85  
The consecration of the chrism in Antelias was significant for four 
reasons. First, the chrism could only be consecrated at the center of the See, 
reinforcing the monastery at Antelias as the center of the Cilician See. 
Second, it could only be completed with the atch that blesses the oil. Third, 
the chrism could only be blessed and consecrated by the Catholicos of the 
See, in this case Zareh, further securing his legitimacy. And finally, the 
chrism made at the center was then transported to the peripheral 
congregations which were under the jurisdiction of that See. No religious 
!
Figure 8: Zareh holding the atch in consecration ceremony of the Holy Chrism later that year. From 
Heghapoghagan Album, 1963. Photo taken by author.  
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rite- including marriage, baptismal, or funerary could take place without the 
chrism. The Cilician See imposed itself as the authority over its parishioners, 
who in turn legitimized this very authority.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Multiple authorities intervened in the 1956 election of the Catholicos of 
the Cilician See and its aftermath. Manifestations of power circulated via the 
vocal encouragement or discouragement of American and Soviet officials, the 
protection of the election in the form of armed Lebanese military personnel 
offered by President Chamoun, the Lebanese police force that accompanied 
Armenian religious officials to and from the presidential complex, and finally 
in the investigation of a missing relic, the arm of St. Gregory, which went 
missing in the days following the election from the tightly guarded monastery 
complex in Beirut. These contentions, along with their political alliances and 
competitions, demonstrate both the permeability and presence of nation-
state borders. These struggles showcased the expansive nature of the power of 
the Cilician See and the ability of the Armenian population in Lebanon to 
make use of state and society categorizations, such as citizenship and the 
Armenian Orthodox sectarian identification, to articulate power. Various 
authorities imposed their own power and/or reinforced the power of the Sees 
through an assortment of traveling, state visits, theft, and electoral coverage.   
 Additional approaches that consider how the actions of Armenian 
institutions shaped and were shaped by different local, international, and 
transnational actors in local and broader contexts have yet to be included 
within Lebanese and Armenian historiographies. The Cilician and 
Echmiadzin Sees used the movement of these actors and their Cold War 
political allegiances to enforce their own authority over the Armenian 
population in Lebanon. In addition, these articulations of power revealed the 
adaptability of religious and political institutions within the new organization 
of the nation-state in the decade following independence. 
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1 All Armenian and Arabic sources have been translated by the author. 
2 These “internal disagreements” were largely related to a candidate’s views on the 
USSR and the role the Echmiadzin See would play in the affairs of the Cilician See. In 
addition, but to a lesser extent, there was also disagreement due to a candidate’s 
outlook on communism. The bishops of the Cilician See largely viewed the 
Echmiadzin See as an agent of the USSR and as an affront to their own power. 
Elections were postponed so as not to further aggravate the tense relationship 
between the two Catholicoi. For further details on the time period between the death 
of Karekin I and the election of Zareh, see Simon Payaslian, “The Institutionalization 
of the Catholicos of the Great House of Cilicia in Antelias,” in Armenian Cilicia, eds. 
by Richard G. Hovanissian and Simon Payaslian (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 
2008). 
3 “Atenagrut‘yun Batgamaworak‘an Zhoghvoh” [Minutes of the Meeting of Religious 
Representatives], Hask No. 1-4 (January-April 1956): 12. The elections taking place 
were seen as the Catholicosate of Cilicia taking a firm position against communism, 
the USSR, and any meddling of the Catholicosate of Echmiadzin. Before being 
chosen Catholicos, Zareh was the Archbishop of Aleppo. 
4 Seta Dadoyan, The Armenian Catholicosate From Cilicia to Antelias (Antelias, 
Lebanon: The Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia, 2003), 95-6. 
5 “50 Women Capture Church; Armenians Elect Anti-Communist Patriarch” The 
Daily Star, February 15,1956. And “Two Armenian Merchants Knifed and Beaten 
Here” in The Daily Star, February 24, 1956.  
6  Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick Schiller have called for the rethinking of the 
boundaries of social life, which, they argue, would take into account “simultaneity,” 
or “living lives that incorporate daily activities, routines, and institutions located in a 
destination country and transnationally.” In Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick Schiller, 
“Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A Transnational Social Field Perspective on Society” 
in International Migration Review (Vol. 38. No. 3, Fall 2004), 1003. See also Peggy 
Levitt, “Routes and Roots: Understanding the Lives of the Second 
Generation Transnationally” in Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (35(7):1225-
1242, 2009) and “Transnational Migration Studies: Past Developments and Future 
Trends.” (with Nadya Jaworksy) Annual Review of Sociology (Vol. 33, August 2007, 
pp. 129-156).  
7  Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick Schiller, “Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A 
Transnational Social Field Perspective on Society” in International Migration Review 
(Vol. 38. No. 3, Fall 2004), 1003. 
8  Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick Schiller, “Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A 
Transnational Social Field Perspective on Society” in International Migration Review 
(Vol. 38. No. 3, Fall 2004), 1003. 
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10  Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick Schiller, “Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A 
Transnational Social Field Perspective on Society” in International Migration Review 
(Vol. 38. No. 3, Fall 2004), 1003. 
11  “Atenagrut‘yun Batgamaworak‘an Zhoghvoh” [Minutes of the Meeting of 
Religious Representatives], Hask No. 1-4 (January-April 1956): 12.  
12 After all, neither see acknowledged the superiority of the other, even though every 
parish of the Catholicosate of Cilicia prayed for the Catholicos of Echmiadzin during 
Sunday mass, and those of the Catholicosate of Echmiadzin did not. 
13 For an exploration of the creation of a “German” identity in a divided Berlin, see 
John Borneman, “State, Territory, and National Identity Formation in Two Berlins, 
1945-1995” in Culture Power Place: Explorations in Critical Anthropology, eds. Akhil 
Gupta and James Ferguson (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001). A comparison 
can be drawn between Germans in Berlin in 1945-1995 as the USSR and the US 
compete to construct German identity and Armenians in Beirut in 1956, where the 
USSR and the US (through its proxy Lebanon) compete for authority. 
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